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Abstract 
The notion of “parenting styles”, introduced by Goold, Campbell and Alexander, has been 
widely acknowledged by the Corporate Strategy literature as a good broad description of the 
different ways in which corporate managers choose to manage and organize multibusiness 
firms. The purpose of this paper is to present a formal test of the relationship between parenting 
style and performance. For this test, we developed a set of agent-based simulations using the 
Performance Landscapes framework, which captures and describes the evolution of firms led by 
different parenting styles in business environments with different levels of complexity and 
dynamism. 
We found that the relative performance of each style is contingent upon the characteristics of 
the environment in which the firm operates. In less complex business environments, the 
Strategic Planning style outperforms the Strategic Control and Financial Control styles. In 
highly complex and highly dynamic environments, by contrast, the Strategic Control style 
performs best.  
Our results also demonstrate the importance of planning and flexibility at the corporate level 
and so contribute to the wider debate on Strategic Planning vs. Emergent Strategies. 
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Corporate-level strategy, or simply “corporate strategy”, is a topic that has received much 
attention since the very early days of the strategic planning field. Andrews (1971) defined 
corporate strategy as “the pattern of decisions that determined a company’s goals, produced the 
principle policies for achieving these goals, and defined the range of businesses the company 
was to pursue”. Porter (1987) referred to corporate strategy as “what makes the corporate whole 
add up to more than its business parts”. The major influence of Corporate-level decisions on the 
overall strategy of a multibusiness firm has been widely reported in the strategy literature 
(Porter, 1987; Goold, Campbell and Alexander, 1994; Brush and Bromiley, 1997; Collis and 
Montgomery, 1997; Chang and Singh, 2000; Bowman and Helfat, 2001; McGahan and Porter; 
2002; Ruefli and Wiggins, 2003.) 
There are certain broad patterns in the way firms manage jurisdiction over decisions between 
the corporate level and business units and exercise strategic control when implementing their 
corporate strategies. Porter (1987) identified four different “concepts of corporate strategy”, 
which he labeled Portfolio Planning, Restructuring, Transferring Skills and Sharing Activities. 
Goold, Campbell and Alexander (1987) also observed different patterns or parenting styles, 
which they labeled Strategic Planning, Financial Control and Strategic Control.  
Goold et al.’s (1987) idea of parenting styles has been highly influential in the strategy 
literature (Chandler, 1991; DeWit and Meyer, 2005; Grant, 2005; McGee, Thomas and Wilson, 
2005). However, we are not aware of any studies to date aimed at developing formal models to 
understand the inner workings of parenting styles and, more importantly, how they affect 
performance.  
This paper addresses this issue by developing an agent-based simulation model that captures 
the central features of Goold et al.’s parenting styles, the relationships between those features, 
and their impact on firm performance over time.  
___________________ 
* We gratefully acknowledge support for this research from Warwick Business School and from IESE 
Business School’s Anselmo Rubiralta Center for Globalization and Strategy  
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We found that the relative performance of each parenting style is highly contingent on the 
characteristics of the business environment in which the firm operates. In less complex 
environments demanding less interdependence between a firm’s different businesses, the 
Strategic Planning style outperforms the Strategic Control and Financial Control styles. These 
results hold for firms operating in both stable and dynamic environments. However, as 
environmental complexity increases, firms respond by increasing the complexity of their 
design. The Strategic Planning style is recommended only in stable business environments; in 
highly dynamic and highly complex business environments (referred to in this study as 
“turbulent” environments), the Strategic Control style performs best, while Strategic Planning 
obtains the worst results, being outperformed by Financial Control.  
These findings not only allow us to assess the relative merits of different styles but also have 
broader implications. They enable us to understand how a firm’s parenting style, the quality of 
its managers’ cognitive representations and the architectural design the firm chooses for the 
development of its corporate strategy interact with one another, and how such interaction 
impacts on the firm’s performance. Our conclusions make it possible to assess the contingent 
importance of sound planning vs. strategic flexibility at the corporate level, thus bringing novel 
elements to the debate between the merits of planning vs. emergence (Mintzberg, 1990; Ansoff, 
1991). Finally, our results give formal support to previous descriptive work arguing the 
superiority of loose, self-organized collaboration between business units over centrally 
imposed, tightly coupled collaboration initiatives.   
This paper starts with a discussion of Goold et al.’s ideas of parent organization and parenting 
styles. Then, we introduce and explain a formal agent-based simulation model of corporate 
strategy that explores the performance of Goold et al.’s parenting styles in different 
environments. In the following section, the results of the simulations are analyzed.  After that, 
we discuss our findings and present our conclusions. Finally, we suggest further avenues for 
research on corporate strategy.   
2. Literature Review 
Several well known scholars have addressed the issue of how to manage and organize firms to 
create corporate advantage, i.e., to create value through corporate-level decisions (Porter, 1987, 
Goold, Campbell and Alexander, 1987, 1994, 1995; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990, Markides and 
Williamson, 1994; Collis and Montgomery, 1998; Goold and Campbell, 2002).  
In particular, Goold et al. (1987, 1994) developed the highly influential idea of parenting 
advantage. They state that the corporate center or parent organization of a multibusiness firm is 
an intermediary between investors and businesses, competing not only with other parent 
organizations but with Investment and Mutual Funds. Corporate strategy, therefore, makes 
sense not only if the value provided by the corporate center is greater than its inherent cost but 
also if the center is the best possible parent for that particular business. That is the case when 
the parent’s skills and resources fit well with the business’s needs and opportunities.  
Goold et al. also examined the issue of fit between decisions made by the parent organization 
and its businesses in terms of the parent’s overall behavior. They discerned certain broad 
patterns of parenting which represent basically different parenting philosophies. They referred 
to these patterns as parenting styles. Styles differ primarily in planning influence and control 
influence (Goold et al., 1994). Planning influence refers to the parent’s approach to strategy  
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formulation; it ranges from low influence (highly decentralized) to high influence (closely 
involved and influential) (Goold et al., 1994). 
Control influence refers to the parent’s approach to the control process. At one extreme are the 
parents that put the emphasis on short-term financial targets; at the other extreme are those 
that focus primarily on strategic goals and so are more flexible with respect to short-term 
financial targets. Between these two extremes are firms that try to strike a balance between 
financial and strategic targets. Based on multibusiness firms’ different approaches to planning 
and control, Goold et al. identify three parenting styles: Strategic Planning, Financial Control 
and Strategic Control.  
Strategic Planning (SP). Strategic Planning parents are closely involved in the formulation of 
plans and decisions. They provide a clear overall sense of direction, within which their 
businesses develop their strategies. They establish detailed planning processes, make 
contributions of substance to strategic thinking, and may have a corporate strategy or mission 
guiding and coordinating developments across the business units. In most but not all cases, 
Strategic Planning companies are heavily involved in encouraging cooperation and 
coordination between businesses. The control process in Strategic Planning companies stresses 
the long-term health and development of the businesses as top priority. Performance targets are 
set in broader, more strategic terms. Annual financial targets are seen as being less important 
than the longer-term strategic objectives.  
Financial Control (FC).   Financial Control parents are strongly committed to decentralized 
planning. They structure their businesses as stand-alone units with as much autonomy as 
possible and with full responsibility for formulating their own strategies and plans. Therefore, 
the M-form is the predominant form or organization among firms following this style, though 
other organizational forms are not precluded.  
Decisions are “owned” by the businesses. The budget is the basic means of control and 
becomes, almost by default, the primary instrument of planning. Each budget, as a contract 
between the corporate office and the business unit, is treated on its own merits and not in 
relation to a larger overall strategic plan.  Current financial performance is the critical measure 
of achievement.  
Strategic Control (SC). Strategic Control parents “seek a balance between the extremes of the 
other two styles” (Goold et al., 1994). They expect businesses to put forward strategies, plans 
and proposals in a “bottom-up” fashion, but proposals are sanctioned at the corporate level if 
and only if they satisfy the right balance of strategic and financial criteria. Businesses are 
usually encouraged to work together to achieve synergy benefits, but within organizational 
structures and responsibilities that stress individual business unit performance.   
If circumstances have changed since the plan was made, it is accepted that business managers 
may not be able to deliver on their original targets and that a revised forecast may be needed. 
Thus, Strategic Control companies seek a balance between financial and strategic targets.  
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3. A model of parenting styles 
To better understand the performance implications of different parenting styles, we introduce a 
model of the evolution of firms led by corporate strategies defined by Goold et al.’s parenting 
styles. With the help of an agent-based simulation, we study, for each parenting style, how 
emergent properties deriving from the interaction between the different parts of the firm affect 
the firm’s evolution and performance in environments of differing complexity and dynamism.   
This model builds on the tradition of behavioral evolutionism (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert 
and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Behavioral evolutionism conceives of firms as 
problem-solving entities involved in processes of search and discovery.  Unlike the classic 
theory of the firm, which treats firms as omniscient rational systems, behavioral evolutionism 
assumes that, while searching for solutions to their problems, firms adopt some form of 
adaptive behavior. While adapting, they consider only a limited number of decision 
alternatives, due to bounded rationality (Simon, 1997). The choice of the set of alternatives 
depends on certain features of organizational structure and the locus of the search 
responsibility and is heavily conditioned by the rules within which such choice occurs (Cyert 
and March, 1963).  
Brabazon and Matthews (2002) state that the concept of adaptive search is meaningful only in 
the context of a defined search space, a means for traversing such space, and the ability to 
determine the quality of a proposed solution. Kauffman’s NK model (Kauffman, 1993) provides 
such a context and so has become the mainstream formal modeling strategy for recent work 
rooted in the evolutionary tradition. Work based on the NK model has been developed and 
adapted by organization theorists to model organizational problem-solving processes showing 
features such as bounded rationality in the consideration of alternatives, the existence of 
interdependencies between subunits that can be manipulated by planning systems, decision 
making based on analogy, and the existence of decision rules that bound the set of possible 
choices (Levinthal, 1997; McKelvey, 1999; Gavetti, and Levinthal 2000; Rivkin, 2000; Caldart 
and Ricart, 2004; Gavetti, Levinthal and Rivkin, 2005; Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2005).  
In the NK model, organizations adapt by modifying their existing form in an attempt to 
enhance their performance in a performance landscape (Levinthal, 1997; Siggelkow and 
Levinthal, 2005). A performance landscape consists of a multidimensional space in which each 
attribute of the organization is represented by a dimension of the space and a final dimension 
indicates the performance level of the organization.   
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In the NK model, the parameter N expresses the number of attributes that characterize the 
entity (in our case, the attributes are policy choices and the entity is a business firm). The 
overall behavior of the firm is characterized by the vector X{X1, X2,...,XN}, where each Xi takes 
the value of 0 or 1. Then, the performance landscape consists of a map of the 2
N possible 
performance values associated with each of the policy choices the firm can make. 
The parameter K is a measure of the number of policies that affect a particular policy’s 
contribution to performance. In other words, K is a measure of the degree of interdependence 
between the firm’s different policies. Then, each attribute of the vector X can take on 2
K+1 
different performance values, depending on the value of the attribute itself (either 1 or 0) and 
the value of the K other attributes with which it interacts.  
Interdependencies between attributes affect the topography of the performance landscape.  In 
the extreme case of K=0, the contribution of each policy is independent of other policies. 
Therefore, an absolute optimum can be reached simply by optimizing decisions at the policy 
level and aggregating their contribution to performance. In this situation, we say that the 
landscape tends to assume a single-peak configuration. 
As the value of K increases, so does the ruggedness of the landscape, i.e., the landscape will 
have more local maxima or “peaks”. In a rugged landscape, actors are assumed to be intelligent, 
but their intelligence is local to their position on the landscape (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert 
and March, 1963). They are assumed to be able to identify the positive and negative gradients 
around their current position, but not of making similar judgments about more distant positions 
(Levinthal and Warglien, 1999). In this case, firms may become trapped in competency traps 
(Levitt and March, 1988).     
In light of the above, in order to develop a simulation model of adaptive firms led by different 
corporate styles we must: a) generate the performance landscapes over which adaptive search 
processes take place; b) determine how firms position themselves at the beginning of the search 
process and how they evolve over time according to their parenting style.  
3.1. Modeling the Performance Landscape     
Modeling the performance landscape implies mapping the 2
N performance values associated 
with each possible configuration of attributes, represented by the vector X{X1, X2,...,XN}, that 
firms can choose during their evolution. In this paper we follow Rivkin (2000) in calling each 
possible complete configuration of N attributes a “strategy”. In the NK model the performance 
associated with each strategy equals the average of the contribution to performance of each of 
the N attributes (Rivkin, 2000). 
3.1.1. Corporate and business decisions 
As we want to focus on parenting styles, we need to develop a model that links corporate 
decisions to business unit decisions. Corporate decisions set the parameters of decisions made in 
the business units, imposing restrictions on decision makers at that level (Milgrom and Roberts 
1992). We operationalized this relationship between decision levels by clustering the N 
attributes within the vector in U subgroups, each of which represents a business unit of a 
multibusiness firm. Within each subgroup or division, D attributes represent the decisions made 
within that business unit.   
6 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
In the model, we assume that all business units have an equal weight on performance and that 
individual decisions made within each business unit also have an equal weight on performance. 
In our simulations, we model a firm with N=9, with variables clustered in three business units, 
U1, U2 and U3. Therefore, we can model 2
3 different corporate strategies. Each business unit 
can then make 2
3 business-level decisions over three attributes: D1, D2 and D3.  Decisions 
made at the corporate level are related to decisions made within the business unit by a simple 
“majority rule” (Gavetti, Levinthal and Rivkin, 2005). For instance, if the corporate decision for 
U1 is “1”, the possible decisions within U1 that fit such corporate decision are only {111}, 
{110}, {011} or {101}. Figure 1 provides an example of how the majority rule works. 
 









3.1.2. Computing the performance of individual attributes 
In order to calculate the performance associated with each strategy, we need to compute the 
performance contribution of each of the firm’s attributes. To do that, we need to model how 
interdependencies between decisions at the corporate level and at the business level impact on 
the performance contribution of the firm’s attributes. Additionally, we need to determine how 
corporate decisions affect business-level decisions. Following Gavetti, Levinthal and Rivkin 
(2005), we modified Kauffman’s basic framework by replacing parameter K by two parameters, 
Kw and KB.  Parameter Kw captures interdependencies within each business unit. Parameter KB 
measures the degree of interdependence of decisions made by the different business units.  
The value of one attribute within each business unit depends on the value of the Kw successive 
elements of the string. Suppose that BU1’s policy choices are represented by the vector {0,1,1}. 
If KW=1, this means that the performance value of the first attribute included in the string (in 
our case, policy decisions) depends on the value of the second element, the performance value 
of the second element depends on the value of the third, and the performance value of this 
depends on the value of the first element. This circular treatment of the vector when 
determining interdependencies between variables in order to compute performance values is 
taken from Kauffman (1993).  
A random number, generated from a uniform distribution ranging from 0 to 1, is assigned to 
constitute the performance contribution of a 0 in the first attribute when there is a 1 in the 
second element. A different random number is generated when there is a 0 in the first element 
and a 0 in the second element. Thus, each policy can take 2
Kw+1 values, depending on the value 
of the policy itself (either 0 or 1) and the value of the Kw other attributes with which it 
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interacts. The procedure is repeated for each attribute of the three divisions. In this way we 
obtain the performance value of each policy within each business unit, taking into account the 
impact of other variables within the same division. 
In order to complete the computation of the performance contribution of each individual 
attribute, we must assess the impact of the interaction between business units on such 
performance. We assumed that every business unit has an impact on the others’ performance 
value. This effect is operationalized by treating corporate decisions as variables (Gavetti, 1999). 
Each business unit can take only two possible values: zero or one. The overall corporate 
strategy is represented by the value of the policies corresponding to the three divisions, for 
example {1,1,0). Then, a random number, generated from the uniform distribution ranging 
from 0 to 1 is assigned to represent the performance contribution of D1 in U1, when U1 takes a 
one, U2 takes a one and U3 a zero.   
The global performance contribution of a given policy variable is calculated according to the 
following formula (Gavetti, 1999): 
Fi= (1-KB)*FWi +KB*FBi , 
 
where Fi is the global fitness contribution of variable i, FWi its contribution taking into account 
interdependencies within the division, and FBi the effect of interdependences between business 
units. The parameter KB tunes the degree of decomposability between the decisions made by the 
different business units. KB can take any value between zero and one. If KB=0, the contribution 
of every business unit to the firm’s overall performance is independent of decisions made 
within other business units. In this case, we can say that there is full decomposability between 
decisions made by different business units. As the value of KB increases, the decomposability of 
the firm’s problems is reduced, because business units’ contribution to performance is affected 
by other divisions’ decisions.  
A particular firm’s overall performance is equal to the average of the performance contributions 
of its N attributes, calculated as explained above. 
3.2. Modeling the Parenting Style 
After developing the performance landscape over which firms’ adaptive evolution takes place, 
we need to model planning influence and control influence for each of the three parenting 
styles. First, we discuss planning influence, explaining how firms choose their positioning at 
the beginning of the simulation. Then, we describe control influence. 
3.2.1. Modeling Planning influence 
Modeling planning influence is about setting the rules that determine the initial positioning of 
firms led by the different parenting styles in the simulation model. According to Goold et al., 
companies following the Strategic Planning and Strategic Control parenting styles develop their 
corporate strategy at the corporate level.
i Financial control firms, in contrast, do not follow an 
overall corporate strategic plan.   
                                              
i Although Strategic Control firms leave more room for “bottom-up” strategic proposals coming from the business 
units, they still make the decision at the corporate level.  
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In order to model strategic choice at M0 in the simulation model, we proceeded in the following 
way. As N=9 and U=3, the firms we modeled can only follow 2
3 “generic” corporate strategies. 
Each of these strategies has the effect of bounding the firm’s evolution within the sub-area of 
the performance landscape that satisfies the majority rule imposed by the specific corporate 
strategy the firm has chosen. We computed the expected value of the performance that the 
firms can achieve in each of those sub-areas of the performance landscape corresponding to the 
eight possible corporate strategies that a firm can choose. Then, we used that information to 
model planning influence for the different styles in the following way: 
a) Strategic Planning and Strategic Control styles. At the beginning of the experiment, the 
computer program randomly assigns to each firm a number C of possible corporate strategies, 
with 0<C<=8. Simulated firms position themselves at M0, choosing the corporate strategy that 
has associated with it the highest expected value among the possibilities assigned by the 
computer.   
Although the corporate strategies represented and chosen by the firms at M0 are grounded on 
the actual landscape, they are based only on knowledge of the expected values of the 
performances associated with the respective sub-areas of the landscape. These representations 
are not a good predictor of the performance of specific strategies in the sub-set of the 
performance landscape chosen by the firm. Although the chosen corporate strategy is, on 
average, the best of the C strategies that firms can represent, this does not mean that all the 
points in the subset of the performance landscape chosen by the firm are attractive. This design 
is consistent with the assumption of bounded rationality of firms as adaptive rational systems 
(March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963; Levitt and March, 1988; Levinthal and 
March, 1993; Simon, 1997). In our case, simulated firms might experience a competency trap 
(Levitt and March, 1988), despite evolving in a subset that is, on average, relatively attractive.    
b) Financial Control Styles. As these firms are not led by an overall plan, we assigned them one 
of the eight possible corporate strategies randomly at M0. 
3.2.2. Modeling Control Influence 
As mentioned above, control influence refers to the parent’s approach to the exercise of 
strategic control. In the simulation, the different approaches are embedded in the rules that 
firms follow during their evolution.  
Once positioned in the performance landscape at M0, in all cases, firms evolve following a local 
search strategy. In Kauffman’s model, local search takes place when the set of business 
attributes are varied only incrementally. In our model, local search works as follows: from an 
initial configuration of the vector X, for example {0,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0}, with an associated 
performance value P0, the firm explores a configuration adjacent to the initial one, for example 
{1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0}, with an associated performance value P1. If P1>P0, the firm adopts the new 
form{1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0} P1 and from there explores another adjacent configuration, for 
example{1,0,1,1,1,1,1,0,0}, with a performance value P3. Otherwise, if P1<P0, the firm does not 
adopt the configuration associated with P1 and explores another configuration, for example 
{0,0,1,1,1,1,1,0,0}, with an associated performance P2. This process is repeated from M0 through  
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M30.
ii In this way, the company engages in local “hill-climbing” or neighborhood search (March 
and Simon, 1958) towards a peak of the performance landscape.  
Control influence can take three forms. As we discussed above, in the Strategic Planning style, 
control is based mainly on strategic considerations and is therefore focused on a long-term 
horizon. In Financial Control firms, control is based purely on short-term financial criteria and 
is not linked to any overall corporate strategic considerations. Finally, Strategic Control firms 
fall in the middle. Goold et al. state that in Strategic Control firms, results are regularly 
monitored against explicit strategic performance targets, but “if … circumstances changed since 
the plan was made, it is accepted that business managers may not be able to deliver on their 
original targets and that a revised forecast may be needed. In this way, Strategic Control 
companies seek a balance between financial and strategic targets.” (Goold et al., 1994, p. 414).  
We operationalized the three different ways to perform control in the following way: 
a) Strategic Planning style. In the simulation model, firms led by the Strategic Planning 
parenting style evolve, throughout the simulation, through local search within the sub-area of 
the performance landscape corresponding to the corporate strategy they chose at M0. The 
majority rule embedded in the chosen corporate strategy bounds choices made within the 
business units throughout the experiment. 
b) Financial Control style. Lacking any initial overall corporate strategy bounding local search 
processes, firms managed according to this parenting style evolve through local search across 
the whole performance landscape, without restrictions of any kind. 
c) Strategic Control style. Firms managed according to this style strike a balance between long-
term strategic objectives and short-term financial ones in the following way. They start their 
evolution within the discipline provided by the corporate strategy they chose at M0. However, if 
after a certain number of moves, T, the firm fails to increase its performance, Strategic Control 
firms abandon the constraints imposed by the majority rule and evolve without restrictions 
throughout the whole performance landscape. In this way, the failure of the initial corporate 
strategy to perform leads the firm to focus on an opportunistic evolution led by purely financial 
criteria. In our study, we modeled two versions of the Strategic Control strategy: T=4 and T=8. 
This allowed us to observe the performance of “Highly Flexible” firms, which abandon the 
initial corporate strategy relatively quickly if it does not lead to improved performance (T=4), 
and of “Moderately Flexible” firms, which abandon their original strategy only after a longer 
period of failure to improve performance. 
3.3. Modeling environmental dynamism and complexity 
Having discussed the way corporate strategies are chosen by the firms modeled in the agent-
based simulation and how these firms evolve through the experiment, in this section we explain 
our choices of environmental conditions faced by the firms. In this way we will be able to 
understand how the parenting styles perform in different kinds of environments. Specifically, 
we modeled scenarios with different degrees of turbulence (Ansoff, 1979). In our model, 
turbulence is captured by two different dimensions. The first is the degree of environmental 
                                              
ii The number of decisions or “moves” of the simulation was limited to 30, because, as can be seen in Figures 4 to 7, 
the performance of the firms is already highly stabilized after roughly 25 moves.  
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complexity faced by the firm. The second is the degree of environmental dynamism faced by 
the firm. 
3.3.1. Environmental complexity  
Following recent work based on the performance landscapes framework (Siggelkow and Rivkin, 
2005), we consider that environmental complexity is reflected in the interdependence among 
the decisions that a firm faces. If we assume that interdependences are not chosen by the firm 
but are dictated by the nature of the decisions themselves, then the complexity of a firm’s 
architectural design reflects the degree of environmental complexity faced by the firm. This 
assumption is consistent with Ashby’s law of requisite variety
iii and Lawrence and Lorsch’s 
Integration and Differentiation framework (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Interdependences 
between decisions are a consequence of the nature of the decisions themselves and are not 
chosen by the firm. In our model, therefore, a firm making decisions whose performance 
contribution has a low degree of interdependence with other decisions is considered to be 
operating in a simple environment. As the focus of our paper is corporate-level strategy, we 
operationalized interdependence by tuning the value of parameter KB, the measure of the level 
of interdependence between the business units. As stated above, this parameter can take any 
value between 0 and 1. Thus, firms with KB=0 and KB=0.25 are considered to be firms operating 
in simple environments. Firms with KB=0 have an M-form structure (Chandler, 1962), while 
firms with KB=0.25 have a moderately integrated CM-form structure (Hill, 1988). A firm whose 
decisions are highly interdependent is deemed to be operating in a complex environment. In 
our model, these are firms for which KB=0.5 and KB=0.75. These firms represent a highly 
integrated version of the CM-form structure.  
Interdependences within business units are tuned by the parameter KW. As KW is a measure of 
the number of links between the business units’ attributes, with D=3, as in our model, KW can 
take only three values: 0, 1 and 2. Following Simon’s treatment of complex problems (Simon, 
1996), we assumed that total decomposability is impossible within a single business unit, as the 
different activities within a single business, s u c h  a s  m a n u f a c t u r i n g ,  s a l e s ,  R & D ,  a r e ,  b y  
definition, interdependent.  Therefore, we discarded cases with KW=0, due to their lack of 
realism, and modeled only firms with KW=1 and KW=2 for each of the four different alternative 
levels of KB discussed above. 
3.3.2. Environmental dynamism 
Following Mintzberg (1983), we understand environmental dynamism as the extent to which 
the firm’s environment is unpredictable (Mintzberg, 1983).  In the model, we operationalize 
dynamism by tuning the quality of corporate management’s cognitive ability at the time of 
representing the strategic alternatives available for the firm. 
Cognition is a forward-looking form of intelligence that is premised on an actor’s belief about 
the linkage between the choice of actions and the subsequent impact of those actions on 
outcomes. Such beliefs derive from the actor’s mental model of the world or “dominant logics” 
                                              
iii The law of requisite variety holds that “control can be obtained only if the variety of the controller … is at least as 
great as the variety of the situation to be controlled” (Beer, 1972, cited in Richardson, 1991). Or in Ashby’s own 
picturesque phrasing, “Only variety can destroy variety” (Ashby, 1956, cited in Richardson, 1991).  
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(Prahalad and Bettis 1986). In contrast, experiential wisdom accumulates as a result of positive 
and negative reinforcement of prior choices (Levitt and March 1988). 
Cognitive representations provide not only a powerful suggestion for an initial choice of 
organizational form, but also a useful discipline on subsequent efforts at experiential search.  
In our paper, we model cognitive representations of two different kinds. The first kind 
corresponds to firms showing a high degree of awareness of the possible strategies to be 
followed. This is the case of firms operating in stable environments. In these situations, the 
different business models are well known and understood and, therefore, corporate choices are 
clear. We modeled this kind of firms in the following way. At M0, these firms “know” the 
expected values of all the possible corporate strategies they can choose (C=8) and adopt the one 
with the highest associated expected value.  
The second kind of cognition represents firms with a poorer understanding of their possible 
strategic choices. This is typically the case of firms operating in highly dynamic and, therefore, 
unpredictable environments, where business models are in rapid flux. We modeled this kind of 
firms by letting them represent only the value of a fraction of all the corporate strategies 
available (C=3). Firms then choose the best one out of the ones it can represent from this 
limited sample.  
Figure 2 summarizes the discussion of turbulence and shows the four different kinds of 
environments included in the simulation experiment, as well as the detailed modeling choices 
comprehended within them. Note that firms following the Financial Control parenting style are 
not led by any corporate strategy; therefore, making distinctions between the quality of 
corporate representations is meaningless for the modeling of this style.  
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4. Architecture of the Simulation 
In Figure 3, adapted from Caldart and Ricart’s Corporate Strategy Triangle (Caldart and Ricart, 
2004), we integrate and synthesize our discussion on the modeling of parenting styles by 
representing the three building blocks that constitute our agent-based model of Corporate 
Strategy. These building blocks are, first, a cognitive representation of the alternative strategies 
that the firm can choose in its performance landscape. Second, a corporate search strategy, 
defined by the parenting style (planning influence and control influence) followed by the firm. 
Finally, the corporate strategy is completed by choosing an architectural design reflecting the 
level of environmental complexity faced by the firm.  
 
Figure 3. Corporate Strategy triangle 























When agents use adaptive rather than optimizing strategies, the consequences of such adaptive 
processes are very difficult to deduce when there are many interacting agents following rules 
that have non-linear effects (Axelrod, 2005). Therefore it is necessary to study the problem with 
the aid of simulation. 
In Table 2 we list the different kinds of firms included in the simulation model, specifying our 
modeling choices regarding the three building blocks of corporate strategy illustrated by Figure 
3. It can be noted that firms were grouped in eight “families”. Each family corresponds to a 
different topography of the performance landscape, i.e., the different combinations of the 
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COGNITIVE REPRESENTATION  ARCHITECTURAL 
OF PERFORMANCE LANDSCAPE DESIGN
Planning Influence Control Influence Parenting style
Strategies represented Complexity
1 8/8 KB=0 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined execution of strategy Strategic Planning
8/8 KB=0 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=4 Strategic Control
8/8 KB=0 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=8 Strategic Control
3/8 KB=0 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined execution of strategy Strategic Planning
3/8 KB=0 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=4 Strategic Control
3/8 KB=0 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=8 Strategic Control
None KB=0 ; KW=1 No Overall Corporate Plan Unbounded local search Financial Control
2 8/8 KB=0 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined execution of strategy Strategic Planning
8/8 KB=0 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=4 Strategic Control
8/8 KB=0 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=8 Strategic Control
3/8 KB=0 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined execution of strategy Strategic Planning
3/8 KB=0 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=4 Strategic Control
3/8 KB=0 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=8 Strategic Control
None KB=0 ; KW=2 No Overall Corporate Plan Unbounded local search Financial Control
3 8/8 KB=0.25 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined execution of strategy Strategic Planning
8/8 KB=0.25 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=4 Strategic Control
8/8 KB=0.25 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=8 Strategic Control
3/8 KB=0.25 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined execution of strategy Strategic Planning
3/8 KB=0.25 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=4 Strategic Control
3/8 KB=0.25 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=8 Strategic Control
None KB=0.25 ; KW=1 No Overall Corporate Plan Unbounded local search Financial Control
4 8/8 KB=0.25 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined execution of strategy Strategic Planning
8/8 KB=0.25 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=4 Strategic Control
8/8 KB=0.25 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=8 Strategic Control
3/8 KB=0.25 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined execution of strategy Strategic Planning
3/8 KB=0.25 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=4 Strategic Control
3/8 KB=0.25 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=8 Strategic Control
None KB=0.25 ; KW=2 No Overall Corporate Plan Unbounded local search Financial Control
5 8/8 KB=0.5 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined execution of strategy Strategic Planning
8/8 KB=0.5 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=4 Strategic Control
8/8 KB=0.5 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=8 Strategic Control
3/8 KB=0.5 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined execution of strategy Strategic Planning
3/8 KB=0.5 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=4 Strategic Control
3/8 KB=0.5 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=8 Strategic Control
None KB=0.5 ; KW=1 No Overall Corporate Plan Unbounded local search Financial Control
6 8/8 KB=0.5 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined execution of strategy Strategic Planning
8/8 KB=0.5 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=4 Strategic Control
8/8 KB=0.5 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=8 Strategic Control
3/8 KB=0.5 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined execution of strategy Strategic Planning
3/8 KB=0.5 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=4 Strategic Control
3/8 KB=0.5 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=8 Strategic Control
None KB=0.5 ; KW=2 No Overall Corporate Plan Unbounded local search Financial Control
7 8/8 KB=0.75 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined execution of strategy Strategic Planning
8/8 KB=0.75 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=4 Strategic Control
8/8 KB=0.75 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=8 Strategic Control
3/8 KB=0.75 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined execution of strategy Strategic Planning
3/8 KB=0.75 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=4 Strategic Control
3/8 KB=0.75 ; KW=1 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=8 Strategic Control
None KB=0.75 ; KW=1 No Overall Corporate Plan Unbounded local search Financial Control
8 8/8 KB=0.75 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined execution of strategy Strategic Planning
8/8 KB=0.75 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=4 Strategic Control
8/8 KB=0.75 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=8 Strategic Control
3/8 KB=0.75 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined execution of strategy Strategic Planning
3/8 KB=0.75 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=4 Strategic Control
3/8 KB=0.75 ; KW=2 Overall Corporate Plan Disciplined only if successful T=8 Strategic Control
None KB=0.75 ; KW=2 No Overall Corporate Plan Unbounded local search Financial Control
Environmental Turbulence
CORPORATE SEARCH STRATEGY 
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In order to ensure that the results reflect the underlying structure of the simulation model and 
not just particular cases of a highly stochastic process, we proceeded in the following way. For 
every set of parameters Kw and KB a landscape is generated. In that landscape, 25 firms of each 
of the seven kinds of firms corresponding to the chosen set of parameters are released during 
the 30 “moves”. The average performance value for each kind of firms in each period is 
recorded in that landscape. Then, another landscape is generated and another seven sets of 25 
firms are released. This operation is repeated for 500 landscapes. This process is repeated for all 
of the eight families of landscapes corresponding to all the combinations of the parameters KW 
and KB included in Table 2 above. Therefore, for every set of parameters, the performance value 
of each kind of firms will be composed of the average of 500 experiments on different fitness 
landscapes, each averaging 25 firms per type of evolution pattern.  
5. Analysis  
Table 3 describes the performance of each corporate style for each of the four kinds of 
environments defined in Figure 2 above
iv. Table 4 shows the differences, in percent, between the 
most successful style and the rest of the styles for the different kinds of environment.  
 



















                                              
iv The results reported correspond to KW=1. We also modeled the same firms for KW=2, but for the sake of simplicity 

































COMPLEX AND STABLE COMPLEX AND STABLE
SIMPLE AND STABLE SIMPLE AND STABLE
TURBULENT  TURBULENT 
SIMPLE AND DYNAMIC SIMPLE AND DYNAMIC
K B=0.5    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning 0.620 0.669 0.682 0.689
Strategic Control T=4 0.620 0.662 0.667 0.671
Strategic Control T=8 0.620 0.669 0.676 0.678
Financial Control 0.501 0.607 0.636 0.650
K B=0.75    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning 0.677 0.701 0.708 0.711
Strategic Control T=4 0.677 0.698 0.700 0.701
Strategic Control T=8 0.677 0.701 0.704 0.705
Financial Control 0.500 0.637 0.669 0.684
K B=0.5    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning 0.572 0.620 0.634 0.640
Strategic Control T=4 0.572 0.625 0.645 0.656
Strategic Control T=8 0.572 0.620 0.636 0.655
Financial Control 0.500 0.601 0.636 0.650
K B=0.75    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning 0.607 0.631 0.638 0.641
Strategic Control T=4 0.607 0.646 0.673 0.686
Strategic Control T=8 0.607 0.634 0.663 0.681
Financial Control 0.500 0.637 0.669 0.684
K B=0    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning 0.549 0.648 0.672 0.685
Strategic Control T=4 0.549 0.639 0.655 0.664
Strategic Control T=8 0.549 0.649 0.665 0.672
Financial Control 0.501 0.601 0.633 0.650
K B=0.25    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning 0.570 0.645 0.665 0.675
Strategic Control T=4 0.570 0.636 0.645 0.652
Strategic Control T=8 0.570 0.645 0.656 0.660
Financial Control 0.501 0.592 0.619 0.633
K B=0    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning 0.549 0.648 0.672 0.685
Strategic Control T=4 0.549 0.639 0.655 0.664
Strategic Control T=8 0.549 0.649 0.665 0.672
Financial Control 0.501 0.601 0.633 0.650
K B=0.25    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning 0.570 0.645 0.665 0.675
Strategic Control T=4 0.570 0.636 0.645 0.652
Strategic Control T=8 0.570 0.645 0.656 0.660

































COMPLEX AND STABLE COMPLEX AND STABLE
SIMPLE AND STABLE SIMPLE AND STABLE
TURBULENT  TURBULENT 
SIMPLE AND DYNAMIC SIMPLE AND DYNAMIC
K B=0.5    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning 0.620 0.669 0.682 0.689
Strategic Control T=4 0.620 0.662 0.667 0.671
Strategic Control T=8 0.620 0.669 0.676 0.678
Financial Control 0.501 0.607 0.636 0.650
K B=0.75    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning 0.677 0.701 0.708 0.711
Strategic Control T=4 0.677 0.698 0.700 0.701
Strategic Control T=8 0.677 0.701 0.704 0.705
Financial Control 0.500 0.637 0.669 0.684
K B=0.5    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning 0.572 0.620 0.634 0.640
Strategic Control T=4 0.572 0.625 0.645 0.656
Strategic Control T=8 0.572 0.620 0.636 0.655
Financial Control 0.500 0.601 0.636 0.650
K B=0.75    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning 0.607 0.631 0.638 0.641
Strategic Control T=4 0.607 0.646 0.673 0.686
Strategic Control T=8 0.607 0.634 0.663 0.681
Financial Control 0.500 0.637 0.669 0.684
K B=0    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning 0.549 0.648 0.672 0.685
Strategic Control T=4 0.549 0.639 0.655 0.664
Strategic Control T=8 0.549 0.649 0.665 0.672
Financial Control 0.501 0.601 0.633 0.650
K B=0.25    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning 0.570 0.645 0.665 0.675
Strategic Control T=4 0.570 0.636 0.645 0.652
Strategic Control T=8 0.570 0.645 0.656 0.660
Financial Control 0.501 0.592 0.619 0.633
K B=0    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning 0.549 0.648 0.672 0.685
Strategic Control T=4 0.549 0.639 0.655 0.664
Strategic Control T=8 0.549 0.649 0.665 0.672
Financial Control 0.501 0.601 0.633 0.650
K B=0.25    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning 0.570 0.645 0.665 0.675
Strategic Control T=4 0.570 0.636 0.645 0.652
Strategic Control T=8 0.570 0.645 0.656 0.660
Financial Control 0.501 0.592 0.619 0.633 
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 15 















Simple and Stable environments. Strategic Planning (SP) shows the best performance when 
complexity is low and the cognitive representations of corporate management are sophisticated 
due to the predictability of the firm’s environment. Although Strategic Control (SC) firms start 
from the same level as SP firms, they “pay” for their opportunistic departure from their initial 
corporate strategy by edging away from SP once they start to pursue strategic explorations 
outside their original focus. Consistent with these results, the Moderately Flexible SC case (T=8) 
outperforms the Highly Flexible SC strategy (T=4). Financial Control (FC) firms improve fast but 
cannot compensate for their initial disadvantage, due to the fact that they do not rely on any 
planning influence, and show the poorest performance. These results were consistent for 
different levels of interdependence within each of the business units, i.e., for KW=1 and KW=2. 
Complex and stable environments. As in the previous case, these kinds of environments show a 
high degree of stability, allowing firms to have a deep understanding of the alternative 
corporate strategies to pursue and their performance implications. However, the increased 
complexity of the environment obliges companies to develop a higher level of interdependence 
between the decisions made by different business units (KB=0.5 and KB=0.75).  
Results follow the same pattern as in the Simple and Stable quadrant discussed above. SP is the 
most rewarding strategy, both for KB=0.5 and KB=0.75, with KW=1 and KW=2. In Table 4, 
however, we can see that, especially for KB=0.75, the gap between the performance of SP and 
the two SC styles narrows with respect to the previous case. The gap between the two SC 
variants also narrows. In these kinds of environments, FC is again the poorest style to follow. 
Simple and Dynamic Environments. In these environments, the dynamism of the environment 
limits managers’ ability to develop a clear representation of all the strategic options available to 

































COMPLEX AND STABLE COMPLEX AND STABLE
SIMPLE AND STABLE SIMPLE AND STABLE
TURBULENT  TURBULENT 
SIMPLE AND DYNAMIC SIMPLE AND DYNAMIC
K B=0.5    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning
Strategic Control T=4 0.00% 1.06% 2.25% 2.68%
Strategic Control T=8 0.00% 0.00% 0.89% 1.62%
Financial Control 23.75% 10.21% 7.23% 6.00%
K B=0.75    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning
Strategic Control T=4 0.00% 0.43% 1.14% 1.43%
Strategic Control T=8 0.00% 0.00% 0.57% 0.85%
Financial Control 35.40% 10.05% 5.83% 3.95%
K B=0    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning
Strategic Control T=4 0.00% 1.41% 2.60% 3.16%
Strategic Control T=8 0.00% 0.14% 1.05% 1.93%
Financial Control 9.58% 7.82% 6.16% 5.38%
K B=0.25    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning
Strategic Control T=4 0.00% 1.42% 3.10% 3.53%
Strategic Control T=8 0.00% 0.00% 1.37% 2.27%
Financial Control 13.77% 8.95% 7.43% 6.64%
K B=0.5    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning 0.00% 0.81% 1.74% 2.50%
Strategic Control T=4
Strategic Control T=8 0.00% 0.81% 1.42% 0.15%
Financial Control 14.40% 3.99% 1.42% 0.92%
K B=0.75    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning 0.00% 2.38% 5.49% 7.02%
Strategic Control T=4
Strategic Control T=8 0.00% 1.89% 1.51% 0.73%
Financial Control 21.40% 1.41% 0.60% 0.29%
K B=0    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning
Strategic Control T=4 0.00% 1.41% 2.60% 3.16%
Strategic Control T=8 0.00% -0.14% 1.05% 1.93%
Financial Control 9.58% 7.82% 6.16% 5.38%
K B=0.25    K W=1 M0 M10 M20 M30
Strategic Planning
Strategic Control T=4 0.00% 1.42% 3.10% 3.53%
Strategic Control T=8 0.00% 0.00% 1.37% 2.27%
Financial Control 13.77% 8.95% 7.43% 6.64% 
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SP style again shows the strongest performance. In the case of KB=0.25 (CM-form), however, 
the gaps between the results of SP and SC are narrower than in the Complex and Stable 
quadrant, indicating that the decision to be opportunistic can lead to almost the same result as 
disciplined SP. For KB=0.25 and KW=1, the difference in performance at M30 is only 0.47%, 
compared to differences ranging from 0.85% to 2.27% in the environments discussed above.   
Turbulent Environments. In environments characterized by high complexity and dynamism, the 
relative performance of the different styles varies substantially with respect to the cases discussed 
above. In these environments, flexibility seems to be more critical as a key success factor. In 
turbulent environments, the Highly Flexible SC style, which scored 3
rd in the three environments 
discussed above, is the top performer, followed by the Moderately Flexible style in the less 
interdependent case (KB=0.5). As KB increases, FC’s performance increases because flexibility 
becomes a valuable feature in environments where cognition is poor and complexity makes 
evolution more difficult due to the increased ruggedness of the landscape. FC ranks 2
nd and very 
close to SC (T=4). In both cases, SP, the most rewarding style in the previous three quadrants, 
shows the poorest performance (7.02% below the best style for KB=0.75 and KW=1 at M30.)   
Our findings can be summarized as follows.  In environments characterized by a low level of 
complexity and high predictability, the discipline embedded in the Strategic Planning style is a 
valuable feature (Figures 4 and 5).  Good strategy formulation gives a firm a decisive advantage 
over rivals following more opportunistic approaches. Moreover, low complexity makes it easier 
for the firm to evolve through local search, thus limiting the potential downsides of the lack of 
strategic flexibility (control influence based on long-term strategic criteria). A Strategic Control 
style firm cannot overcome through higher flexibility the loss of a well grounded initial 
strategic direction, this gap becoming smaller as complexity, measured by KB and KW, increases. 
Indeed, the Moderately Flexible SC outperformed the Highly Flexible SC style. The worst 
strategy was Financial Control, as it cannot overcome through its maximum flexibility the 
decisive disadvantage resulting from the fact that its initial position is not based on strategic 
intelligence but merely random choice. However, it is worth mentioning that the higher KB and 
KW become, the closer the Financial Control style gets to catching up with the other styles. 
 
Figure 4. Simple and Stable Environment  
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Figure 5. Complex and Stable Environment 













The situation changes radically when the complexity of the architectural design is relatively 
high or high (Figures 6 and 7). In these cases, the relative performance of firms is contingent 
upon the level of environmental dynamism. For stable environments, the different styles rank 
as in low complexity environments. But although the trade-off between the benefits of 
disciplined execution of a well formulated strategy and the benefits of strategic flexibility 
continue to favor the former, the gap between the two is narrower.  
In dynamic environments (KB=0.5 and KB=0.75), the results of the trade-off between discipline 
and flexibility invert radically. The best results belong to the SC Highly Flexible style, a 
strategy that rapidly sacrifices strategic discipline if the firm fails to make consistent progress 
in the short term. Not surprisingly, in this context the combination of a rigid strategy led by 
poor cognition and the difficulty of evolving due to the high suppressing effects
v embedded in a 
complex architectural design make the SP style the poorest performer in the four types of firms 
modeled. Even the initially “blind” FC Style outperforms SP very easily. Lack of flexibility to 
adapt to the relatively unknown environment combined with a complex architectural design 
with high suppressing effects hamper the ability of Strategic Planning firms to perform 





                                              
v A strategic change is said to suffer suppressing effects when there is a side-effect or “backfire” to that initiative that 
prevents it from achieving the intended effects.  For instance, by increasing the length of production runs a firm may 
gain in manufacturing cost efficiency, yet sales may be lost as a result of the firm’s reduced ability to respond 
quickly to changes in demand, thus offsetting the impact of increased operational efficiency on profits.   
vi We also modeled firms with KB=0.25 and KB=0.75.  We observed that the strength of disciplined strategies fades 
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Figure 6. Simple and Dynamic Environment 






















Figure 7. Turbulent Environment 
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6. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper was to provide a formal test of Goold et al.’s (1987) parenting styles, 
a widely accepted way of describing the broad patterns followed by corporate managers in 
leading their multibusiness firms. Parenting styles differ in their planning influence –
centralized (high influence) or decentralized (low influence)– and their control influence –based 
on strategic or financial criteria. We opted to approach the topic innovatively using an agent-
based simulation model using the performance landscapes framework. Agent-based simulations 
based on Kauffman’s NK model allow us to model how emerging properties of an evolving 
entity derived from interaction between its different parts affect its performance. Thus, they 
constitute a modeling strategy that narrows the gap between closed-form solutions that 
consider firms as omnisciently rational entities and descriptions from empirically grounded 
theory. 
This modeling strategy allows us to model firms as adaptive rational systems, as described by 
Cyert and March (1963). By approaching organizational problems through this modeling 
strategy we improve our understanding of how the features that constitute a parenting style 
interact and affect the firm’s performance as its adaptive process unfolds. With our model we 
can distinguish the relative performance of the different styles in four different kinds of 
environments that vary in complexity and dynamism. This proved to be a relevant distinction, 
as results show that the relative performance of the different parenting styles in turbulent 
environments were radically different from their performance in the rest of the environments.   
Our results also have implications for the debate on planning vs. emergence (Mintzberg, 1990, 
Ansoff, 1991). They suggest that in stable environments, Porter’s (1996) advice to strategic 
leaders to resist “constant pressures to compromise, relax trade-offs and emulate rivals” (pg. 77) 
is sound. Given a deep knowledge of their competitive arenas (in our study, “performance 
landscapes”) and the ability to easily evolve incrementally when complexity is low, SP firms 
outpace rivals that engage in varying degrees of opportunistic behavior (SC) or that completely 
lack overall corporate planning (FC). Environmental stability enables firms to formulate 
strategies led by cognitive representations based on a deep knowledge of the cause-effect 
relationships embedded in their strategic choices, leading to higher expected performance. 
These situations are consistent with the rational tradition of strategic planning embedded in the 
design, planning and positioning schools of strategy (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel, 1998).   
As the environment becomes more dynamic, however, this situation changes substantially. 
Dynamism limits managers’ ability to adequately represent the firm’s strategic options. As 
stated above, poor representations coupled with high complexity make strategies based on a 
very disciplined execution of the strategy as initially formulated the worst possible option. 
Given the widespread agreement among academics and practitioners that business 
environments are becoming increasingly dynamic and complex (D’Aveni, 1994; Day and 
Reibstein, 1997; Eisenhardt and Brown, 1998; Normann, 2001; Galbraith, 2002), these 
conclusions are especially relevant, as what we have labeled “turbulent” environments are 
precisely the kind of environments found in an increasing number of industries today.  
This conclusion is consistent with Brews and Hunt’s (1999) empirical finding that as 
environmental instability grows, so does planning flexibility. However, our results are not a 
case in favor of purely emergent approaches. We found that in turbulent environments the best 
style is Strategic Control, a strategy based on an overall initial plan and the flexibility to  
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abandon it opportunistically under certain circumstances. This style always outperforms 
Financial Control strategies having maximum adaptive flexibility but no initial positioning 
intelligence. These results are consistent with Mintzberg’s (1994) notion of Realized Strategy as 
a synthesis of an intended strategic direction and the flexibility to address relevant emergent 
aspects.  
These insights also have important implications for organizational design. Our simulations show 
that the performance of a firm facing a complex environment and therefore having a highly 
interdependent architectural design, such as a highly interdependent CM-form or a matrix 
structure, is highly contingent on the quality of the cognitive representation that drives the 
corporate strategy. While it is obviously non-trivial to distinguish ex-ante in particular cases 
whether a company has a sophisticated or a rough understanding of its competitive landscape, it 
is important to know that the more complex the organizational form, the more risky it will be to 
adhere rigidly to an established strategic plan. The complexity of highly interdependent structures 
makes incremental change more difficult, increasing the risk that the firm might suffer a 
“complexity catastrophe” (Kauffman, 1993; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998), i.e., the inability to 
evolve successfully as a result of the constraints imposed by the suppressing effects of its highly 
interdependent design. If these firms chose to adopt an M-form, the quality of corporate cognition 
would be less critical for their performance, as the lower ruggedness of their landscape eases their 
adaptive evolution process. Even so, for a firm having related businesses and operating in a 
highly turbulent environment, adopting an M-form might lead to an “error catastrophe” 
(Kauffman, 1993; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998) or failure to address the degree of complexity of 
the environment. If a firm has a cluster of highly related and, therefore, highly interdependent 
businesses (as they demand close coordination for activity and knowledge sharing), it will need to 
find a balanced organizational design that addresses the needs of knowledge and activity sharing 
without provoking a complexity catastrophe. Thus, these findings give formal and more general 
support to insights provided by case study-based research that prescribes the superiority of 
emergent approaches for corporate value creation (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1998; Chakravarthy, 
Zaheer and Zaheer, 2001; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001; Goold and Campbell, 1999, 2002; Helfat 
and Eisenhardt, 2004). Emergent “self organized” interdivisional cooperation initiatives are, by 
definition, loosely coupled, i.e., less demanding in terms of the interdependences they create 
across units. By contrast, centrally imposed interdivisional collaboration initiatives tend to be 
formally structured, generating tight couplings affecting business units sometimes regardless of 
the real need for interdivisional collaboration (Goold and Campbell, 1999). These situations 
increase interdependences unnecessarily, with the proliferation of coordination meetings, “ad 
hoc” reporting requirements, etc. 
Self-organized, loosely-coupled collaboration initiatives offer a hope for managers who 
struggle to navigate between the “Scylla and Charibdes” resulting from either naively simple 
designs that fail to address environmental variety, or unnecessarily complex ones showing very 
high suppressing effects. An architectural design that relies more strongly on self-organized 
interdependence at the business unit level allows firms to “economize” on organizational 
interdependencies while still achieving the potential for synergy development resulting from 
interdivisional activity sharing and knowledge transfer.  
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7. Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Agent-based simulations based on adaptations of Kauffman’s NK model are an insightful way 
to describe the broad patterns observed in the evolution of a boundedly rational agent’s 
strategy in a setting affected by non-linearly related variables.  
However, as Kauffman’s model was originally developed in the context of the natural sciences, 
organizational scholars using this technique must make major efforts to introduce features of 
organizational life that are completely absent in the original formulation of the model. Recent 
work (Gavetti, Levinthal and Rivkin, 2005; Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003; Siggelkow and 
Rivkin, 2005; Lenox, Rockart and Lewin, 2004; Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2005) has taken 
valuable steps in this direction.  
Our study in particular does not address important features of firm evolution, such as the fact 
that firms can learn more alternative strategic options “on the road”. Furthermore, our research 
depicts evolutionary processes, while firms are actually involved in a coevolutionary process, 
interacting with other entities whose interaction alters the topography of the performance 
landscape, making adaptive evolution more challenging and difficult to predict.   
Further research in this field based on simulation studies could benefit from addressing these 
issues and others such as the introduction of bounded rationality in performance evaluation 
and the implications of proactive vs. failure-induced application of new learning.   
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